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I.  INTRODUCTION: IS OPEN SOURCE LICENSING OF 
PATENTS A SOLUTION TO DRUG COSTS AND ACCESS? 
The high cost of medicines and resulting lack of access to 
many of these treatments represent some of the most troubling 
issues of our time and are the subject of much attention both in 
the developedand the developingworld.1 There can be no 
doubt that biomedical science continues to make breakthroughs 
in the treatment of many diseases. Indeed, in the last twenty-
five years, treatments for chronic conditions such as HIV 
infection, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease have been 
developed and widely adopted by health care providers.2 Yet, 
globally—and even within the U.S.—these pharmaceutical 
treatments are not always available to or utilized by those who 
need them because of their high costs.3 
Patents have been widely identified as being at least one of 
                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Diane V. Havlir & Scott M. Hammer, Patents Versus 
Patients? Antiretroviral Therapy in India, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 passim 
(2005); Mary Moran, A Breakthrough in R&D for Neglected Diseases: New 
Ways to Get the Drugs We Need, 2 PLOS MED. 0828, 0828 (2005); Yochai 
Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents, 305 SCIENCE 
1110 passim (2004); Bernard Pécoul, New Drugs for Neglected Diseases: From 
Pipeline to Patients, 1 PLOS MED. 019, 019 (2004); Patrice Trouiller et al., 
Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public-
Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 218891 (2002). 
 2. J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health 
Care Market, HEALTH AFF., Sept.Oct. 2001, at 43. 
 3. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, In Sour Economy, Some Scale Back on 
Medications, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/22drug.html; John D. Piette et 
al., Cost-Related Medication Underuse Among Chronically Ill Adults: The 
Treatments People Forgo, How Often, and Who is at Risk, 94 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1782 passim (2004). 
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the causes of the problem.4 Patents give their owners a legal 
monopoly and grant a right to exclude others from use of an 
invention. As such, the patent holder can charge a fee for a 
license to use the patent. The pharmaceutical industry 
generally characterizes these amounts charged as reasonable, 
in light of very large research and development costs.5 The 
argument is that intellectual property (IP), in the form of 
patents, provides the incentive to invest in the risk-laden drug 
development business. 6 
Others maintain that the financial benefit reaped by 
pharmaceuticals is out of proportion with the cost to society as 
a whole in terms of high prices and lack of access to health care 
innovations.7 They further question the notion that patents are 
necessary for innovation.8 
For some, the solution to this impasse is a change to the 
way IP rights—and patent rights in particular—are exercised. 
In particular, it is now increasingly common to point to open 
source, modeled on non-proprietary models used in the 
computer software arena, as a mode of IP practice that can at 
once make IP more widely accessible and by implication can 
lower the costs of drugs. In her 2008 book, Biobazaar, Janet 
Hope effectively sets the bar for this discussion: 
A key premise of this book is that open source principles of technology 
development, licensing, and commercial exploitation offer at least a 
partial solution to the innovation lock-down caused by extensive 
private control over scientific and technological information within a 
                                                      
 4. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical 
Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 1 PLOS MED. 183, 183 (2004); see also 
John E. Sulston, Chair, Inst. for Sci., Ethics and Innovation, Who Owns 
Science (May 19, 2009) (see http://www.terry.ubc.ca/index.php/2009/04/30/who-
owns-science-sir-john-sulston-on-may-19th); Jean O. Lanjouw, Patents, Price 
Controls, and Access to New Drugs: How Policy Affects Global Market Entry 
passim (The National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Patent No. 
11321, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11321. 
 5. Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New 
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849 (2002). 
 6. See, e.g., Lila Feisee, Biotech. Indus. Org.’s Dir. for Fed. Gov’t 
Relations & Intellectual Prop., Anything Under the Sun Made by Man (April 
11, 2001), available at http://www.bio.org/speeches/speeches/041101.asp 
(pointing to, for instance, the explosion of the biotechnology industry following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrobarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), 
which declared that genetically engineered bacteria were patentable, as 
evidence of the power of patents to stimulate innovation). 
 7. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 21314 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 215. 
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highly concentrated industry structure.9 
There are those who take the concept further and have 
proposed an open source approach in biology as a means toward 
ongoing access to knowledge that results in less costly, more 
widely available health care products. Thus, for example, 
Stephen M. Maurer and his colleagues propose an open source 
system in which “volunteers [would] use a variety of computer 
programs, databases and computing hardware” to share ideas 
that have not been patented and hence to develop lower cost 
pharmaceutical products.10 Maurer and his colleagues go on to 
promise that “open-source drug discovery is feasible” and invite 
scientists to make the model work explicitly, in this case, for 
developing drugs for tropical diseases.11 Kathleen M. Nolan-
Stevaux argues similarly that an open source approach to 
biology is the best incentive—versus other IP alternatives—to 
stimulate drug development with the aim of improving access 
in the developing world.12 The aim, again, is to embrace an 
alternative to conventional patent rights to allow 
simultaneously (1) a model of contribution and open 
participation in innovation and (2) an approach to drug 
development that does not allow for the monopoly rents 
imposed by patent exclusivity.13 
There have been some efforts in this area. In the context of 
neglected tropical diseases, the Tropical Disease Initiative 
(TDI)14 focuses its efforts on coordinating charities to create 
nonprofit venture-capital firms in the guise of “Virtual 
Pharmas” to search out and develop promising treatments.15 
The TDI intends to play the role of a “kernel” in this process 
and provides a platform for scientists from laboratories, 
universities, institutes, and corporations to collaborate in order 
                                                      
 9. JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 20 (2008). 
 10. Maurer et al., supra note 4, at 185. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to 
Address the Access & Research Gaps, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L. J. 271 (2007). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Tropical Disease Initiative, http://tropicaldisease.org/ (last visited Oct. 
20, 2009). 
 15. Maurer et al., supra note 4, at 183. 
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to find new drugs to treat neglected tropical diseases.16 The 
idea is that all knowledge is shared and not patented and that 
contracts will be awarded by TDI at some point to put the 
drugs through the clinical testing process. 
In addition, Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) is funded 
by the Government of India to provide an open source platform 
for aggregating scientific knowledge in order to discover drugs 
to treat diseases that are prevalent in the developing world 
with the aim of providing affordable healthcare to people 
around the world, particularly in developing countries.17These 
emerging platforms reflect the growing interest in open source 
as an alternative intellectual property mechanism that may 
ensure greater openness and access to information. 
By the admission of all, these efforts represent first steps 
and open source drug development remains unproven as a 
strategy to reduce drug costs and to increase access. The aim of 
this article is to take the discussion of open source and drug 
development a step further and to rigorously test the 
hypothesis that has been proposed, namely that an open source 
drug development process offers a potentially realistic solution 
to the drug cost and accessibility issues. Toward this end, the 
present article asks what open source drug development would 
look like and whether it is likely to yield success on its own 
dual criteria of enabling ongoing innovation and increasing 
access of end products. This discussion draws on a rigorous 
analysis of the drug development process as well as the 
technical details of licensing patents on an open source basis. 
Overall, the article concludes that open source is not a 
viable option for drug development if drug development is 
understood as being the process of moving a molecule, pathway, 
or process past drug discovery through to the approval of a 
                                                      
 16. Id. 
 17. Open Source Drug Discovery, What is OSDD, 
http://www.osdd.net/what-is-osdd (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 
OSDD]. The government of India has committed $32 million to the OSDD 
project and released $8.2 million. Much like the TDI, students, scientists, 
researchers, academics, institutions, and corporations from around the world 
may become partners in OSDD, where they can contribute to and synthesize 
available knowledge in order to discover new drugs. New molecular entities 
(NMEs) will not be patented, but instead will put into the public domain. With 
the aid of the Government of India or philanthropic funding, the development 
of drugs is to be outsourced to contract research organizations and other 
private industry partners. Id. 
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drug or diagnostic by regulatory authorities.18 It is indisputable 
that open source operates elegantly in the information 
technology context and has produced a number of widely used 
programs, even while preserving access to the underlying 
source code. Moreover, it is likely that in the drug discovery 
context and in very early development stages open source could 
succeed at keeping certain underlying intellectual property 
open and available for further innovation. As discussed below, 
however, it is not clear that full-scale open source drug 
development can yield less costly and more accessible drugs. 
Patent rights differ markedly from copyrights and the efforts 
that must be undertaken to make open source workable for 
drug compounds are difficult and expensive. Even if 
intersecting patent rights could be resolved, the legal and 
regulatory requirements of drug development make that 
process expensive and resource-heavy, whether or not open 
source plays a part in the process. Given all this, it cannot be 
maintained that an open source drug development system 
offers a better alternative than other models that have been 
proposed. 
This article begins in Part II with a review of the origin of 
open source in the copyright context of the information 
technology arena. It then examines in detail how open source 
might operate with respect to patents, the form of intellectual 
property generally used for compounds in drug development.19 
In so doing, it points to two aims that have been identified for 
using open source with respect to patents: (1) to preserve access 
                                                      
 18. See University of California, San Francisco, School of Pharmacy 
Glossary, http://pharmacy.ucsf.edu/glossary/d/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) 
(defining “drug development” and “drug discovery”). “Drug discovery” refers to 
the research process that identifies molecules with desired biological effects 
and selects them as having promise as new therapeutic drugs in humans. 
 19. The public discussion of open source for drug development variously 
refers to open source genomics and open source biotechnology. Biotechnology 
is an industry that commercializes biological compounds. Genomics, in turn, 
characterizes a broad field of study, comprised of anything having to do with 
the genome. As such, it also characterizes biological compounds. The goal of 
this article is to examine the potential use of open source for active compounds 
that might be patented and used in drug development; these could be derived 
from the study of genomics or could be chemical compounds. For this reason, 
this article refers to compounds used in drug development, with the 
understanding that this could describe a range of types of materials. 
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to the information,20 thus fostering the possibility of an open 
system of innovation and ongoing fruitfulness of research,21 
and (2) to yield products that are less costly and more 
accessible.22 In order to test the open source concept in drug 
development, the article goes on to present a detailed overview 
of what is entailed in that process following the discovery stage, 
right through to clinical trials, approval and post-marketing 
obligations.23 This article then turns, in Part III, to the topic of 
what an open source drug development process might be, how 
open source licensing provisions might play out, and how 
development could be undertaken even in the absence of a large 
pharmaceutical company sponsor. 
Part IV examines the question: would use of an open 
source licensed compound in the drug development process 
likely meet the complementary goals of preserving access to the 
fundamental innovation and yielding a product that is more 
accessible and less expensive? A further issue considered is 
whether public or private enterprises would want to engage 
open source drug development, given the potential impacts. In 
reaching findings on these issues, the article concludes in Part 
V with suggestions of other alternatives that offer potentially 
more viable options for reigning in the costs of drug 
development and resulting prices for pharmaceutical products. 
II.  OPEN SOURCE: BACKGROUND AND OPERATION 
A.  HISTORY OF OPEN SOURCE: ROOTS IN INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY/SOFTWARE 
Open source—and its precursor in the information 
technology community, GNU—was developed in response to the 
commercial software industry’s IP practices.24 As a general 
principle, software is primarily written in code which, as a 
                                                      
 20. Although the fundamental rationale underlying patents is that the 
owners are granted a limited monopoly in return for making their discoveries 
public, in practice the intellectual property system does provide a degree of 
control over information and can be said to limit access. 
 21. See, e.g., HOPE, supra note 9, at 15154. 
 22. See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 7, at 22526. 
 23. See University of California, San Francisco, School of Pharmacy 
Glossary, supra note 18 (discussing stages of drug discovery). 
 24. FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. 
STALLMAN 15768 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002) [hereinafter STALLMAN: SELECTED 
ESSAYS]. 
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written form, is subject to IP coverage by copyright. A copyright 
allows the holder to prevent others from copying, distributing, 
or adapting the code.25 The common practice in 
commercializing software is to require users to agree to a 
license before use, which bars the user from sharing or copying 
the software.26 
For a number of software innovators, the growing 
commercialization of software posed a barrier to ongoing 
innovation because it forced users to agree to a license for use 
and barred them from seeing or altering source code. The free 
software and open source movements grew out frustration with 
the practice of closing off programs as they developed, even to 
those who participated in their development at earlier stages.27 
Richard Stallman, and later Linus Torvalds (Linux), developed 
operating systems that would leverage the contributions of 
many while leaving the source code open to any and all 
contributors. Stallman termed his approach, “GNU” (which 
stands for “Gnu’s Not Unix”, a recursive acronym).28 The Linux 
operating system, which was first released by Torvalds, 
represented a further development of GNU and became 
emblematic of the movement. Torvalds’s approach became 
known as “open source,” because of the availability of the 
source code.29 
Developers of the free software movement designed a 
copyright license which could help share programs and 
maintain open access to source code: this is the so-called 
General Public License (GPL) or “copyleft.”30 The GPL was 
                                                      
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 26. Paul Goodman, Shrink Wrap License Agreements: Unravelling Some of 
the Confusing Legal Issues, 9 MACTECH (1993), available at 
http://www.mactech.com/articles/mactech/Vol.09/09.03/Shrinkwrap/index.htm. 
 27. STALLMAN: SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 24, at 15768; see also Free 
Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). 
 28. Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software 
Movement, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 
23 (1st ed. 1999), available at 
http://oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/copyright.html. 
 29. See id. at 53. It is worth noting that the nomenclature and distinctions 
between these movements remains an issue of some debate. Richard Stallman, 
for example, is firmly against using “open source” as a description of a 
movement that includes GNU. Id. 
 30. SAM WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN’S CRUSADE 
FOR FREE SOFTWARE 128 (2002). 
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deemed necessary, because copyrights are otherwise self-
executing.31 That is, just by writing a software program, it is 
deemed copyrighted; no further action is needed on the part of 
the programmer and a user is obligated not to copy the source 
code.32 The GPL is an affirmative rejection of this right. It 
publicly states that the source code is not copyrighted and is 
instead available to copy, change and freely distribute (thus the 
name “copyleft”).33 The GPL is said to be viral because the 
license obligation applies to each subsequent licensee.34 
Collectively, these developments became known as open 
source, though there are a number of variant approaches.35 As 
developed in the Linux context, supporters of the open source 
movement also believe that the more people working on a 
particular problem (or software design), the better.36 The 
philosophy is that the greatest possible non-hierarchical 
collaboration can maximize the potential value and the 
potential benefit of a new idea. Thus, work is generally 
structured in a non-hierarchicalor bazaar-likemanner with 
the prototypical example of principle in action being the 
development of the Linux operating system. The number and 
abilities of programmers working on the product are not limited 
to those that exist within the boundaries of a single firm but 
rather include a diffuse network.37 
In the software sector, this novel approach has provided a 
successful platform for researchers and commercial enterprise. 
The internet, for example, relies on massive numbers of Linux 
                                                      
 31. See id. at 12223. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License (version 3, 
June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html [hereinafter GNU GPL]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Richard Stallman, President, Free Software Found., Lecture at the 
University of British Columbia: Free Software in Ethics and in Practice (Feb. 
6, 2009) [hereinafter Stallman lecture]. There are disputes amongst the 
progenitors of these movements as to the correct terminology and whether 
“free software” is indeed synonymous with “open source.” Rather than 
weighing in on this discussion, I adopt the term “open source” to refer to the 
free and open source code that was the hallmark of the movement. 
 36. See Jae Yun Moon & Lee Sproull, Essence of Distrubted Work: The 
Case of the Linux Kernel, in DISTRIBUTED WORK 381-404 (Pamela Hinds & 
Sara Kiesler eds., 2002). 
 37. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON 
LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 41 (1st ed. 
1999). 
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servers (for Google, among other things).38 Other open source 
based software companies have achieved financial success by: 
(1) selling a convenient package of products, some of which may 
be freely available, (2) consulting to other software companies, 
or (3) providing technical support for the program.39 While the 
software may be available elsewhere for free, users 
(particularly non-programmers) may prefer to buy a product 
they trust from a source that strives to serve their needs. 
According to one commentator, IBM Corporation likely makes 
twice as much profit from its support of open source software 
(Linux based products) than from regularly licensed products.40 
B.  OPEN SOURCE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTOR 
The aim of devising an open source approach for 
biotechnology and specifically drug development is similarly to 
create a system that will allow contributors and users greater 
freedom to use innovation in productive, more inclusive ways. 
As described by Janet Hope in her book, Biobazaar: The Open 
Source Revolution and Biotechnology: 
Open source . . . is an attempt to renegotiate [the relationships in IP] 
based on (1) a reframing of intellectual property as a means of 
facilitating, rather than hindering, the production of knowledge as a 
public good and (2) the gradual transformation of biotechnology 
research and development practices toward the production of more 
convivial [user oriented, available] tools.41 
Just as open source software was a reaction to the 
restrictions placed on programmers and users by proprietary 
practices in that sphere, the open source movement in 
biotechnology has arisen largely in response to concerns about 
the implications of patent use. In the biotechnology arena, 
these concerns include questions about the implications of 
                                                      
 38. Amanda McPherson, Linux is Everywhere (Now in the Air), LINUX 
FOUND., AMANDA’S BLOG (August 28, 2007, 6:07 AM), 
http://www.linuxfoundation.org/node/2426. 
 39. Examples of other open-source-based software companies are Apache 
HTTP Server, osCommerce, and Mozilla Firefox. 
 40. John Newton, Professional Open Source Software, JOHN NEWTON’S 
THOUGHTS, IDEAS AND OPINIONS ON CONTENT MANAGEMENT, ENTERPRISE 
SOFTWARE AND OPEN SOURCE, July 29, 2009, 
http://newton.typepad.com/content/2009/07/professional-open-source-
software.html 
 41. HOPE, supra note 9, at 329. 
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ownership of biological materials42 for the practice of science,43 
and for research and access to ultimate end health care 
products.44 
Nonetheless, application of the open source approach to 
biotechnology is not a simple matter. There are important 
differences between software and health care products that 
make the transfer of the model complex as outlined briefly in 
the table on page 228. 
                                                      
 42. With respect to IP, questions have long been raised about the ethics of 
allowing ownership of genetic material. See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY 
NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE passim (2001) (acknowledging concerns about the ethics 
of patenting). These concerns continue. See, e.g., John Conley, The ACLU v. 
Myriad Genetics Suit: Legitimate Challenge or Publicity Stunt?, GENOMICS L. 
REP. (June 4, 2009), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/06/04/aclu-v-myriad-
genetics-suit-legitimate-challenge-or-publicity-stunt/. The IP and ethics issue 
is an important one; however, it is not the focus on the present article. 
 43. See, e.g., JOHN SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD: 
A STORY OF SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME (2002) 
(recounting the importance of open source in projects such as the Human 
Genome Project); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2000). 
 44. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 INDUS. 
& CORP. CHANGE 1013 (2006); Robert Cook-Deegan & Tom Dedeurwaerdere, 
The Science Commons in Life Science Research: Structure, Function and Value 
of Access to Genetic Diversity, 58 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 299 (1996). 
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Table 1: IP Practices: Software v. Biotechnology 
 
 
The most significant difference is that the former is written 
in code and is thus generally protected by copyright, while the 
latter is generally characterized by empirical scientific work 
and concomitant insights and is thus subject to patent 
protection (with the exception of bioinformatics and related 
disciplines). The differences between copyright and patent are 
significant. Copyright attaches to work automatically (and is 
thus cheap to obtain) and prevents copying of written code or 
text.45 A copyright in a work lasts for up to 70 years (depending 
on the jurisdiction) and there is little maintainence cost, 
though enforcement can be expensive.46 
Patents, in contrast, are granted to inventions that meet 
requisite subject matter conditions as well as standards of 
utility, non-obviousness, and novelty.47 Patents are expensive 
to obtain and have significant maintenance costs (not to 
mention high enforcement costs). Patents essentially provide 
the patent holder with the right to exclude others from 
                                                      
 45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101122 (2006). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301305 (2006). 
 47. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101103 (2006). 
 Software  Biotechnology  
Predominant Form of 
IP protection  
Copyright  Patent  
Development 
Timeline  
Short with high 
turnover  
Long  
Need for 
equipment/laboratory 
space  
Low  High  
Regulatory review 
and oversight  
Low  High  
Product Granularity Low High 
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practicing the invention.48 The relationship between copyright 
and patents is something like the relationship between a cake 
recipe and the cake one can make. The copyright essentially 
prevents others from copying the recipe itself; the patent gives 
the holder the right to prevent others from making the cake for 
commercial distribution. 
Software and biotechnology further differ in terms of the 
development time of products as a general principle. As a gross 
generalization, software can be developed rather quickly and 
generally has a short market turnover with improved versions 
and competitor products emerging quickly. There is no 
government approval requirement for such products and they 
can be placed on the market rapidly. In contrast, biomedical 
products—the end result of biotechnology research—require 
long development times and lengthy government regulatory 
review with ongoing oversight.49 Additionally, the stereotypical 
software development process requires little more than 
computer technology and human innovators, while 
biotechnology generally requires expensive specialized 
equipment, laboratory space, and access to biological substrates 
and various research tools, all of which are subject to rigorous 
codes and audit by regulatory authorities.50 
A final difference exists in the need for product 
granularity. For software, there is no limitation on the nature 
and number of changes that can be made to the product as it is 
developed and even subsequent to market entry. In contrast, 
the significant regulatory requirements faced by biomedical 
products mean that a single product must be frozen at the 
stage of development in which it enters the regulatory process; 
any changes made thereafter could result in redoing earlier 
development stages and thus cause significant delays. This 
issue is discussed in more detail later. 
Proponents of open source in biotechnology have taken the 
position that these differences are not limiting and that open 
source can be successfully applied in this area.51 Just as in 
                                                      
 48. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 564 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
 49. See infra Part III. 
 50. See infra Part III. 
 51. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 189 (“. . . I argue in this chapter and the 
next that none of the differences between software and biotechnology 
constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to implementing an open source 
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software, open source in biotechnology is not intended as a 
rejection of IP per se. Rather, the aim is to control IP to achieve 
the goal of maximum production of knowledge and to ensure 
that knowledge remains open and available even once modified. 
As described by its proponents, open source in 
biotechnology starts with IPin this case a patent or 
patentson relevant material. The intent is that the patented 
material can then be licensed on open source terms: non-
exclusively and (generally) royalty free. Often an open source 
license will also include a viral clause, analogous to the GPL or 
copyleft provision in open source software, that obligates 
licensees to share improvements or modifications on similar 
open source terms. The aim is to insert future controls in order 
to ensure that the open source objectives continue to be met.52 
There can also be an obligation to “grant-back” to the licensor 
on open source terms, any improvements to the licensed 
technology.53 For example, in the CAMBIA BiOS License for 
Genetic Resources Indexing Technologies, Version 1.3 (BiOS 
GRIT), there is an obligation for licensees to share all 
“improvements” with BiOS to be further licensed on similarly 
open source terms. 54 The idea there is that the original licensor 
would become a repository of all knowledge relating to the 
originally licensed technology and would ensure that all such 
knowledge was then available to licenseeswith the aim of 
maximum possible knowledge production.55 
                                                      
‘biobazaar.’”). 
 52. In this sense, it is arguable that open source licensing is a form of 
defensive patenting. 
 53. See, e.g., The CAMBIA BiOS License for Genetic Resources Indexing 
Technologies (version 1.3), 
http://www.bios.net/daisy/GRITLicense/750/1170.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2009) [hereinafter BiOS GRIT]. In some ways, the obligation to grant back 
rights is in opposition to the philosophy of open source. However, as used here, 
the notion is to heighten knowledge sharing potential by ensure that licensors 
and licensees freely benefit from all knowledge related to the patented 
information. 
 54. Id. § 3. 
 55. Some, e.g., Janet Hope maintain that the CAMBIA BiOS license is not 
truly open source because of the control being in the hands of CAMBIA. See, 
e.g., Janet Hope, Open source genetics: a conceptual framework in GENE 
PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS PATENT POOLS, 
CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 19192 
(Geertrui Van Overwalle, ed., 2009); see also Dianne Nicol and Janet Hope, 
Cooperative Strategies for Facilitating Use of Patented Inventions in 
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Putting such licenses into practice has proven to be far 
from simple, especially for any license that aims to apply as 
open source licensed quantities are developed into commercial 
drug products. Key questions include: what happens to open 
source information once licensed? Can a licensee make 
improvements and then patent that information? Can a 
licensee patent innovations derived from open source material? 
Is there an obligation to share improvements with the licensor 
or other licensees? And fundamentally, what happens to open 
source licensed material as you move downstream to 
commercial products? Is there any incentive for participation in 
such a system? These questions for open source in the 
commercial drug development context are examined in greater 
details below. 
C.  OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY IN PRACTICE? 
There are a few examples of groups attempting to put open 
source biotechnology into an applied context.56 Possibly the 
most well known is the BiOS initiative of CAMBIA, an 
Australian nonprofit which is dedicated to making genomics 
resources widely available, particularly in the agricultural 
sector. 57 In essence, BIOS is intended to operate as a repository 
for patented information in a few fields, including, for example, 
“genetic resources indexing technologies.”58 A party developing 
such a technology chooses to license the technology, molecule or 
substance to BiOS for purposes of making the technology 
accessible. BiOS then takes on the responsibility of licensing 
these materials on open source terms to all comers on certain 
terms, deemed by BiOS to promote openness and access. 
The BiOS model has not been fully tested in a commercial 
context, however, and it is not clear whether it presents an 
acceptable alternative for developers of applied products. For 
example, among other things, the BiOS GRIT that is currently 
available states that the open source terms of that agreement 
override any other contract or license held and bars the licensee 
                                                      
Biotechnology,” 24 LAW IN CONTEXT 85, 107 (2006) (not disputing the accuracy 
of this comment, but rather pointing to the CAMBIA license as an illustration 
of an open source-like approach). 
 56. Janet Hope explores these examples as well as a number of others in 
BioBazaar. HOPE, supra note 9, at 30918. 
 57. See BiOS Home Page, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2009). 
 58. Id. 
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from entering into contracts with conflicting terms.59 Such a 
term may appear the most direct way of ensuring that open 
source terms survive subsequent contractual relationship. 
Conceptually, however, it has the potential to make ongoing 
development relationships very difficult for the BiOS licensee. 
Other efforts are also underway, though for the most part 
these focus on drug discovery effort, which are relatively free 
from complex licensing arrangements. For example the Open 
Source Drug Discovery60 (OSDD) organization, established 
recently in India, endeavors to establish an open source 
genomic community aimed at leveraging individual efforts in 
drug discovery for certain identified projects to increase access 
to outputs. Like BiOS, OSDD offers itself as a repository for 
material given by researchers who have an interest in 
advancing access to innovations and therefore agree to OSDD’s 
terms in submitting their materials to it. Among other things, 
the OSDD license agreement obligates contributors to share 
their innovations with OSDD, as well as any improvements on 
that innovation.61 In informal conversations, OSDD has stated 
that it intends to use the materials in its database to advance 
drug discovery and development. However, as of yet, there is no 
indication as to how this would proceed. 
The fundamental question of this article is whether an 
open source drug development pathway is a viable option. 
Toward that end, I first review in some detail the scientific and 
regulatory steps required in drug development. Thereafter, I 
evaluate the potential of open source in this process. 
III.  DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
Drug development refers to the processes involved in 
taking a candidate drug or biologic62 through the stages 
                                                      
 59. BiOS GRIT, supra note 53, § 3.4. 
 60. OSDD, supra note 17. 
 61. Open Source Drug Discovery TWiki Registration Terms and 
Conditions § 3.2 (Proprietary Rights), 
http://sysborgtb.osdd.net/bin/view/TWiki/TWikiRegistration (last visited Oct. 
20, 2009). 
 62. U.S. statutory law distinguishes between a drug (“intended for use in 
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.” 25 U.S.C. 
§ 321 (2006)) and a biologic (“any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, 
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product or analogous 
product applicable . . . to the prevention, treatment or cure of disease.” 42 
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necessary to obtain marketing approval. The process begins 
with the pre-clinical studies required to show sufficient safety 
to enter into the clinical process of human testing. In general, 
the end goal of drug development is to have a product that is 
approved by relevant regulatory authorities and can be 
prescribed to or otherwise made available to patients. 
Joseph A. DiMasi and his colleagues at Tufts University 
have demonstrated that the drug development process is 
lengthy and expensive.63 There is much debate to just how 
expensive the process is: Merrell Goozner and Marcia Angell 
have attacked drug industry accounts that the cost of 
development for a drug is around $800 million dollars, 
suggesting that this figure includes heftyand perhaps 
unjustifiedamounts for marketing and promotional budgets.64 
This high estimate reflects the fact that successful (or even 
unsuccessful) drug development, starting from an early stage of 
research and development, requires consideration and strategy 
on a wide range of factors including, inter alia: 
 
- identification of the disease indication65 to be treated, 
                                                      
U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006))these definitions are intended to distinguish between 
small molecule products and large molecular entities produced in living cells. 
In the U.S., drugs and biologics are generally approved under distinct, though 
analogous, regulatory pathways and by different divisions of FDA (i.e. the 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Review (CDER) versus the Center for 
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) (with some limited exceptions)). 
For purposes of this article, the term “drug” is used to include drugs and 
biologics. 
 63. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 152 (2003). 
 64. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW 
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); MERRIL GOOZNER, THE 
$800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004). 
 65. Drugs are approved for particular “indications,” which denote the 
conditions or diseases they are intended to treat; usually the “indication” for a 
drug is very narrow, so a drug will be approved not for the treatment of 
cancer, or even for cancer in a particular organ such as the bladder. Instead it 
will be approved for a certain type of bladder cancer, and often for a particular 
stage and sub-type of cancer and treatment priority such as a “second-line 
treatment for stage 3 superficial bladder cancer.” As far the drug regulatory 
authorities (Health Canada or FDA) are concerned, once approved for any 
particular indication, a drug may generally be used, on the judgment of the 
prescriber, for any condition whatsoever. That is, the health authorities do not 
regulate the practice of medicine; they are the gatekeepers for letting drugs 
into the market. Physicians are constrained in their use of drugs “off-label” by 
their own assessments of drug safety and efficacy, plus very important 
considerations of liability and reimbursement. 
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-potential for adverse events, 
-intellectual property landscape, 
-regulatory requirements and hurdles, 
-the ability to conduct research and trials in a 
regulatory compliant manner, 
-potential to manufacture and deliver the 
drug/compound, 
-willingness of payors to pay for the end product, and 
-the potential market for the product. 
 
It is worth noting that the high figure includes opportunity 
costs as well as the costs of both successful and unsuccessful 
candidates, and not just those entities that come out of 
research and development and are successfully developed into 
commercial products. The latter is significant since even after 
years of preclinical study, 75-80% of drugs that begin clinical 
trials do not make it through to be approved products.66 
Many dispute the high estimates given for drug 
development costs,67 arguing that pharmaceutical companies 
fold in marketing and other administrative costs in order to 
create the perception that high R&D costs justify high prices 
for end products.68 For the present discussion, it is not material 
whether the cost is $50 million or $800 million per novel 
candidate; the point is that the process is, in absolute terms, 
expensive and the risks of failure are high. The various steps in 
the process are described below. 
A.  DEMONSTRATING SAFETY AND EFFICACY: PRE-CLINICAL AND 
CLINICAL TRIALS 
Once a candidate is selected for development, the goal is to 
meet the regulatory requirements so that a marketing 
authorization will be granted. As a general rule regulators 
require a sponsor to demonstrate that a proposed drug (or 
                                                      
 66. See, e.g., DiMasi et al., supra note 63, at 165 (“Our statistical analysis 
of compounds in the Tufts CSDD database of investigational drugs that met 
study criteria yielded a predicted final clinical success rate of 21.5%.”). 
 67. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 64; GOOZNER, supra note 64. 
 68. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 64. Christopher P. Adams & Van V. 
Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 
Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006) (stating that some variation in cost of 
development is due to the firm’s strategic choice). 
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biologic) is safe and efficacious and that the benefits of the drug 
(or biologic) outweigh the risks at the specified dose and for the 
specified indication.69 These overarching standards, as well as 
the specific clinical trials required, are harmonized to a degree 
amongst international regulatory authorities including the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the U.S., the European 
Medicines Agency (EMEA), and other worldwide bodies. In fact, 
these countries collectively participate in the International 
Conference on Harmonization (ICH) which directs its focus on 
making “recommendations on ways to achieve greater 
harmonization in the interpretation and application of 
technical guidelines and requirements for product registration 
in order to reduce or obviate the need to duplicate the testing 
carried out during the research and development of new 
medicines.”70 
The following diagram, taken from the FDA website, gives 
an overview of the process as implemented in the U.S. 71 The 
red arrows refer to variations on the approval route that may 
be used when there is an identified unmet medical need or 
there is pressure to allow the drug for use, even while it is 
being studied. These variations have specific requirements and 
are only applicable in limited situations. 
 
                                                      
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006). 
 70. International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, 
http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) 
(“The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements 
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) brings together the 
regulatory authorities of Europe, Japan and the United States and experts 
from the pharmaceutical industry in the three regions to discuss scientific and 
technical aspects of product registration.”) [hereinafter ICH]. This article 
discusses the FDA requirements while acknowledging that similar 
requirements exitss for approval in Canada, the European Union, Japan, 
Australia, and a number of other developed countries. 
 71. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
THE CDER HANDBOOK 4 (1998), available at 
http://druganddevicelaw.net/CDER_handbook.pdf (CDER Handbook is 
currently under revision; non-revised version provided by source outside of 
FDA); see also Jim Beck & Mark Herrmann, FDA’s CDER Handbook – 
Undergoing Revision, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW (Aug. 14, 2009, 11:42AM), 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/08/fdas-cder-handbook-
undergoing-revision.html [hereinafter CDER Handbook]. 
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Diagram 1: The New Drug Development Process: 
Steps from Test Tube to New Drug Application Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drug development generally begins after a target molecule, 
process, or pathway has been identified.72 As in the above 
chart, the first step in drug development is to conduct a barrage 
of standard pre-clinical studies on the identified molecule in an 
effort to provide baseline evidence that it is safe and efficacious; 
this work is a precursor to putting the molecule into human 
beings.73 
Preclinical testing is undertaken to evaluate the drug’s 
toxic and pharmacologic effects through in vitro and in vivo 
laboratory animal testing.74 As a part of this process, 
                                                      
 72. See generally ULF MADSEN & TOMMY LILJEFORS, TEXTBOOK OF DRUG 
DESIGN AND DISCOVERY 134 (2002) (overviewing basic drug design and 
discovery). 
 73. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2009). 
 74. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY 
IND STUDIES 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformat
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genotoxicity screening is performed. In addition, researchers 
undertake investigations on drug absorption and metabolism, 
the toxicity of the drug’s metabolites, and the speed with which 
the drug and its metabolites are excreted from the body.75 At 
the preclinical stage, the FDA will generally ask, at a 
minimum, that sponsors: (1) develop a pharmacological profile 
of the drug, (2) determine the acute toxicity of the drug in at 
least two species of animals, and (3) conduct short-term toxicity 
studies ranging from two weeks to three months, depending on 
the proposed duration of use of the substance in the proposed 
clinical studies.76 All of this work must be done according to 
stringent Good Laboratory Practices (GLP), which require 
meticulous control and recording of every aspect of processes 
employed.77 The GLP standards differ materially from controls 
and procedures that would be ordinarily practiced in a research 
institution. Thus, research carried out first in a university 
laboratory generally has to be repeated in GLP facilities to be 
acceptable for regulatory submissions. Many companies 
contract their preclinical work out to specialized companies 
that undertake these kinds of trials for a fee. 
With sufficient preclinical data evidencing the safety of the 
molecule, sponsors can move forward toward undertaking 
clinical trials. In order to initiate this process and prior to being 
allowed to begin any trials in human beings, the sponsor will 
need to file an “Investigational New Drug” (IND) application or 
the equivalent.78 The IND is aimed at demonstrating to 
regulators that the sponsor has satisfactorily conducted 
sufficient pre-clinical investigations to suggest that the drug 
will be safe and potentially effective in humans.79 Generally, at 
                                                      
ion/Guidances/ucm078933.pdf [hereinafter FDA IND Guidance]. 
 75. Id. at 11. 
 76. FDA, Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions on 
Drug Development and Investigational New Drug Applications, 
Investigational New Drug Application: What are the FDA Requirements for 
Pre-Clinical Studies?, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssista
nce/ucm069898.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2009). 
 77. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 58 (2009). 
 78. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a) (2009). 
 79. FDA, Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplicatio
n/default.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter FDA IND Application 
website]. 
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this stage the sponsor will meet with the regulator to discuss 
the information that is available or being developed about the 
molecule, process, or pathway and address questions that 
might be raised. 
If there are no objections to the IND within a specified 
period (thirty days in the U.S.),80 the sponsor will then initiate 
the procession of clinical trials. The trials are typically 
conducted, per regulatory directives, in four phases: 
 
- Phase 1: The drug is tested in a few healthy volunteers 
(generally less than a hundred) to determine if it is 
acutely toxic and to obtain basic safety data, dosage, 
pharmacology data, etc. 
- Phase 2: Various doses of the drug are tried in a small 
number of individuals with the targeted disease or 
condition to determine basic efficacy data and to collect 
additional safety data. 
- Phase 3: The drug is typically tested in multiple 
comparative, double-blind controlled trials to 
demonstrate that the product is safe and effective for its 
intended use. Sponsors typically confer with the FDA 
prior to starting these Phase 3 trials to determine what 
data is needed, since these trials often involve hundreds 
of patients and are very expensive. 
- Phase 4: These are post-approval trials that are 
sometimes a condition attached by the FDA to the 
approval.81 
 
All trials must be conducted according to Good Clinical 
Practices (GCP), which are rules promulgated by regulators 
and designed to ensure that research is conducted in a 
transparent and reliable manner.82 The GCP obligations are 
                                                      
 80. 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(c)(1) (2009). 
 81. Lewis J. Smith, Types of Clinical Studies, in DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT: FROM MOLECULE TO PRODUCT AND BEYOND 107, 10722 
(Ronald P. Evens ed., 2007). 
 82. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2009). The International Committee on 
Harmonisation defines Good Clinical Practice as a “standard for the design, 
conduct, performance, monitoring, auditing, recording, analyses, and reporting 
of clinical trials that provides assurance that the data and reported results are 
credible and accurate, and that the rights, integrity, and confidentiality of 
trial subjects are protected.” ICH, ICH HARMONIZED TRIPARTITE GUIDANCE: 
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significant and pose an additional hurdle to organizations 
involved in this process. GCPs require attention to a range of 
factors including informed consent, record-keeping, design of 
trials, safety assessments, trial monitoring, financing, and 
other relevant considerations.83 Furthermore, everything done 
under GCP is subject to audit.84 
It is important to recognize that carrying out clinical trials 
requires significant and varied expertise at each new stage. 
Phase 1 trials (also known as “first in human”) trials are 
“[i]nitial studies to determine the metabolism and 
pharmacologic actions of drugs in humans, the side effects 
associated with increasing doses, and to gain early evidence of 
effectiveness.”85 They “may include healthy participants and/or 
patients,”86 and often must be carried out in special units that 
have the capacity to monitor and respond to dosing responses 
very quickly.87 Phase 2 trials primarily assess relevant dosing 
but also offer first indications of efficacy as well as additional 
safety data.88 Phase 3—or pivotal trials—are expanded trials 
undertaken after the preliminary evidence suggests that drug 
effectiveness has been obtained.89 These much larger and more 
expensive trials gather additional information to evaluate the 
                                                      
GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE E6(R1) § 1.24 (1996) 
http://www.ich.org/ (click “E” under the ICH logo; then click “Good Clinical 
Practice” hyperlink; then click “E6(R1)” link) (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) 
[hereinafter ICH Guidance]. The ICH Guideline has been adopted by the FDA. 
ICH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E6 GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONSOLIDATED 
GUIDANCE GUIDELINE FOR GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE (1996), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM129515.
pdf (the ICH Consolidated Guidance has been adopted by the FDA as a 
condensed version of the ICH Guidance) [hereinafter ICH Consolidated 
Guidance]. The FDA and the EMEA recently announced that they were 
undertaking a joint eighteen-month focus study on GCPs designed to ensure 
that clinical trials submitted in drug marketing applications in the United 
States and Europe are conducted uniformly, appropriately, and ethically. See 
Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA, European Medicines Agency 
Launch Good Clinical Practices Initiative (Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm174983.
htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 83. See, e.g., ICH Guidance, supra note 82, at §§ 46. 
 84. Id. 
 85. ClinicalTrials.gov, Glossary of Clinical Trials Terms, 
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/glossary (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Smith, supra note 81, at 108. 
 88. ClinicalTrials.gov, supra note 85. 
 89. Id; see Smith, supra note 81, at 109. 
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overall benefit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an 
adequate basis for approval and labeling.90 
The number of participants, duration of trials, study 
design, dosing, and many other parameters must be chosen for 
each trial in accordance with the specific characteristics of the 
drug, including identified potential for toxicity, potential 
reactions with other drugs, absorption, metabolism and 
excretion characteristics, as well as the mechanics of dosing 
and potential patient adherence.91 Many of these 
considerations are outlined in therapeutic area-specific 
guidance documents authored by the FDA in the U.S.,92 and 
analogous bodies in other jurisdictions. 
All along this process, sponsors will confer with regulatory 
authorities to identify unexpected results, adverse events, 
potential changes to the protocol, and any other unforeseen or 
significant events.93 It is additionally important to note that 
once the clinical trial process begins, the sponsor becomes 
increasingly bound to the specific compound and formulation 
being tested. Any changes to the compound itself or the 
manufacturing process need to be reported to regulators and 
could, hypothetically, invalidate study results generated with a 
prior or alternate version of the compound.94 
Once the entire package is completed, the sponsor will 
submit a New Drug Application (NDA)95 or Biologics License 
                                                      
 90. ClinicalTrials.gov, supra note 85. 
 91. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS 
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN 
DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (May 1998), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformat
ion/Guidances/UCM078749.pdf [hereinafter FDA Drug Efficacy Guidance]. 
 92. See, e.g., FDA, Clinical/Medical Drug Guidances, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm064981.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 93. FDA, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and 
Effective, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143534.htm (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter FDA Drug Review Process website]. 
 94. Prabu Nambiar & Steven R. Koepke, CMC Sections of Regulatory 
Filings and CMC Regulatory Compliance During Investigational and 
Postapproval Stages, in FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS: A GUIDE FOR 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, MEDICAL DEVICES AND BIOLOGICS 203-06 (Douglas J. 
Pisano & David Mantus eds., 2008). 
 95. FDA, New Drug Application (NDA), 
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Application (BLA)96 (or equivalent in other jurisdictions) to the 
FDA. The review time and process varies from country to 
country, but will generally involve questions to the sponsor 
during the review and may potentially involve the convening of 
an advisory board of experts in the field to advise the regulator 
on how to respond. In the U.S., review timeframes range from 
six months for fast track review to ten-plus months for non 
fast-track applications.97 
There is no guarantee of approval, even if the regulator has 
been involved throughout the development process. The 
application is generally reviewed by multiple disciplines 
separately, including pharmacology, toxicology, CMC 
(chemistry, manufacturing, controls), and medical.98 Any of 
these groups may find issues that they feel make the risk-
benefit balance unacceptable. In recent years, the number of 
                                                      
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/ (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2009). 
 96. The Biologics License Application (BLA) is a request for permission to 
introduce, or deliver for introduction, a biologic product onto the market. See 
21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2001). The BLA is regulated under 21 C.F.R §§ 600680. In 
many ways, the BLA is analogous to the NDA, though the specific 
requirements reflect manufacturing, safety, and efficacy issues that are 
unique to biologics. FDA, Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process 
(CBER), 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Biol
ogicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess/default.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) 
[hereinafter BLA Process]. 
 97. In the U.S., the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments (“PDUFA”) 
II (as well as subsequent PDUFA re-authorizations in 2002 and 2007) call for 
the FDA to review and act on 90 percent of priority NDAs and BLAs within six 
months and standard NDAs and BLAs and efficacy supplements within ten 
months. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (establishing a priority review 
pathway); 21 U.S.C. § 379g(l) (2009) (establishing prescription drug user fees 
in order fund prescription drug review by FDA); FDA, Section A: PDUFA 
Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures Fiscal Years 2008 
Through 2012, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm1192
43.htm (visited January 17, 2010). 
 98. Ramzi Dagher, Deputy Div. Dir., Office of Oncology Drug Prods. 
(OODP), Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), Food and Drug 
Admin., The CDER Review Process, (Apr. 16, 2007). It is worth noting that 
health authorities that “approve” drugs make their determinations on the 
basis of scientific criteria of safety and efficacy; they do not take into 
consideration the costs. Costs are generally a concern for other administrative 
bodies—like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) in the 
U.S. 
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new drugs representing new chemical entities (NCE), as 
opposed to “follow-on” or “me-too” versions of previously 
existing drugs, approved by the FDA in the U.S. has declined 
sharply. In 2008, there were under twenty-five such NCEs 
approved by the FDA in the U.S.99 Moreover, in the wake of 
Vioxx and other highly publicized safety issues, regulators have 
implemented numerous additional controls—pre-approval and 
post-approval—that may further limit the availability and 
approval of new drugs.100 
Even after approval, there are continuing monitoring 
activities. As a condition of approval, regulators may require 
post-marketing studies (Phase IV) to track adverse events or 
safety issues of concern.101Sponsors are required to track and 
report adverse events and to continually monitor and update 
labels as new information is made available about the safety of 
the drug.102Further, before entering the market, the sponsor 
will need to interact with pricing and reimbursement 
administrators in multiple countries to determine the actual 
availability of the drug to patients.103Depending on the 
sponsor’s aims, post-marketing will also require attention to IP 
and regulatory exclusivities to ensure that monopoly rights are 
not being infringed. This in itself can be a labor intensive and 
costly undertaking. 
                                                      
 99. PhRMA, New Medicines Approved in 2008, 
http://www.phrma.org/files/2008Approvals.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 100. Bette Hileman, FDA Moves to Improve System, CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 29, 2004 at 16-17, available at 
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/8247/8247earlygov.html; see Press Release, Food 
and Drug Admin., FDA, Public Health Advisory: Safety of Vioxx (May 22, 
2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPa
tientsandProviders/ucm106274.htm (discussing Merck’s decision to withdraw 
Vioxx and the FDA’s cooperation therewith). 
 101. Smith, supra note 81, at 111. Note as well that the FDA Amendments 
Act of 2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007), added Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) provisions which the FDA can 
impose on drugs associated with greater safety risks; see 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 
(2009). These additional obligations, which can include additional distribution 
controls or monitoring efforts, can be very expensive. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Stephen F. Carroll, Discovery and Nonclinical Development, in 
DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: FROM MOLECULE TO PRODUCT AND 
BEYOND 84-107 (Ronald P. Evens ed., 2007). 
MARDEN LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:43 AM 
2010] OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT 243 
B.  GENERICS 
The generic pathway offers an abbreviated route for 
completing the regulatory requirements discussed above and, 
as such, is cheaper, less risky, and less burdensome to 
complete.104 It is important to realize, however, that approval of 
a generic version of a drug is not automatic once there is an 
approved brand version of a drug. First, generic approval is 
only available once relevant patent terms and exclusivities 
have expired, so there is generally some period before an 
application for approval of a generic can be submitted.105 
Second, the FDA must individually approve generic versions of 
drugs based on GLP, GCP, and GMP (Good Manufacturing 
Practices) compliant evidence of bioequivalence and 
bioavailability,106 as well as support for any differences 
between the proposed generic version and the approved drug.107 
For the clinical trial data related to the drug, the generic 
applicant can rely on the brand drug’s original submission.108 
Thus, generics get a “shortcut” to marketing authorization and 
avoid the most failure prone aspect of drug development. 
Nonetheless, generics are subject to the same regulatory 
parameters as their brand counterparts. Generic 
manufacturers also have post-marketing safety reporting 
obligations and are subject to similarly tight controls on 
                                                      
 104. This discussion has merged drugs and biologics in the discussion of 
drug development. Importantly however, for purposes of generics, there are 
very different regulatory approval mechanisms because of the nature of the 
substances themselves. It is much more straightforward to copy small 
molecule drugs based on chemical formulae and conformation information. 
Biologics, by their nature, are very large complex molecules and are produced 
in cells rather than being synthesized. As a result, very minor variations in 
production conditions can have drastic impacts on safety and efficacy. While 
there is no generic pathway for biologics in the U.S. as of the writing of this 
article, this may change with the passage of a health care bill by Congress in 
2010. 
 105. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53, 314.92, 
314.94, 314.95 (2009) (detailing the general procedure for submitting 
abbreviated applications). 
 106. See e.g., FDA, Pharmaceutical cGMPS for the 21st Century – A Risk-
Based Approach: Second Progress Report and Implementation Plan, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/gmp/gmp2004/GMP_Finalreport2004.htm (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2009) (discussing FDA initiative focused at increasing drug product 
quality through regulation). 
 107. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94 (2009). 
 108. Id. 
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ingredient quality, sourcing, and other manufacturing issues.109 
The net result is that while it is less burdensome to obtain 
regulatory approval of a generic drug, it is still a costly process 
with strict controls and follow up that must be maintained. 
Generics cannot simply appear on the market; they too must be 
the subject of careful preparation and planning by the 
sponsoring entity. 
C.  PATENT TERMS AND EXCLUSIVITIES 
It is worth noting the basis for drug market exclusivities. 
These remain key drivers for conventional drug development 
because pharmaceutical companies are able to earn a 
significant return on investment during these exclusivity 
periods. As explored in the next section, open source drug 
development changes this equation and thus may reset the 
incentive considerations. 
In essence, there are two types of exclusivity: (1) that 
conferred by patent and (2) that conferred by regulators—also 
known as regulatory exclusivity (e.g. orphan drug) or data 
exclusivity (e.g., new chemical entity).110 Patent exclusivity 
reflects the IP landscape of the drug.111 For the term of the 
relevant patent(s) on a drug, competitors are precluded from 
using that protected information. Generally, when a drug is 
approved, it or the processes used in its manufacture are 
covered by a host of patents, the strongest of which may be a 
“composition of matter” patent that protects the molecule 
representing the active ingredient in the drug.112 As long as a 
molecule is under patent protection, no one can market a copy 
of the drug without infringing the patent (or being obligated to 
license the IP). Critics often point to patents and the aggressive 
enforcement of patent rights by pharmaceutical companies as a 
leading cause of high drug prices.113 
Data exclusivity deserves special mention. Data 
exclusivities conferred under national regulatory regimes may 
add market protection, and for that reason are highly pursued 
                                                      
 109. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.96, 314.98 (2009). 
 110. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(j)(5)(D)(iii)-(iv), 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)-(iv) (2006); 21 C.F.R. 
314.108 (2009). 
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). 
 112. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 113. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 12, at 27476. 
MARDEN LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:43 AM 
2010] OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT 245 
by most pharmaceutical companies. The original intent of data 
exclusivity provisions was to offer an additional incentive for 
drug development to pharmaceutical companies in exchange for 
a planned entry of generic versions of drugs.114 Data exclusivity 
effectively bars regulators from allowing any other drug 
application from relying on the data submitted and, in this 
sense, blocks any abbreviated submissions during the term of 
the exclusivity.115 Thus, during the term of exclusivity, no 
competitor can rely on the data for a brand name drug to obtain 
approval for a generic or copy of that drug. Hence, the generic 
pathway is not available and approval can only be based on 
submission of a full regulatory package. The two most common 
forms of data exclusivity in the U.S. are five years granted for 
“new chemical entities” that have never before been the subject 
of an FDA approval, and three years for a new indication that 
requires significant additional clinical studies.116 
These data exclusivities generally run concurrently, 
though can extend beyond patent terms and are awarded for 
successful approval of new chemical entities or new indications 
for which significant clinical studies were required. Often 
times, pharmaceutical companies submit data for new 
indications to get the three-year exclusivity period at a time 
when their patent on a drug is close to expiration.117 The added 
regulatory exclusivity effectively prolongs the period of market 
exclusivity and is often referred to by critics as 
“evergreening.”118 
                                                      
 114. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 
28,896 (July 10, 1989); see also Frederick Tong, Note, Widening the Bottleneck 
of Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775 (2002) 
(explaining that the original intent of the Hatch-Waxman legislation was to 
increase access to generic drugs). 
 115. During the term of data exclusivity, another party could submit an 
application for the same drug (provided that patent issues are addressed), but 
would have to submit a full New Drug Application because it could not rely on 
any data previously submitted. When there is no data exclusivity, and patents 
are addressed, the Abbreviated New Drug Application submission relies 
extensively on data on file at the agency. Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28,896. 
 116. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2009). 
 117. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 727 (2005). 
 118. Robert Weissman, Victory and Betrayal: The Evergreen Patent System 
of Pharmaceutical Company Tactics to Expand Patent Protections, 23 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 2002, 
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2002/062002/weissman.html (last 
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IV.  OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
The regulatory requirements associated with drug 
development are significant and exist without respect to the IP 
context in which the development takes place. Thus, any 
compound licensed under open source terms is still subject to 
exactly the same regulatory requirements for market 
authorization, with some minor requirements that could differ 
under specific circumstances.119 Open source drug development 
does differ from conventional drug development in other ways, 
however. 
The diagram below provides a rough outline of these 
differences. 
 
Diagram 2: Open Source Drug Development120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The blocks on the right side of the diagram, under the 
Drug Development heading, apply to any drug development, 
whether conducted using open source or any other IP approach. 
                                                      
visited Dec. 9, 2009). 
 119. There are limited ways that the IP status of a drug development 
project impacts regulatory obligations. For example, if there are no patents 
covering an approved drug, there will be no obligation to list patents in the so-
called “Orange Book.” As such, any generic seeking to copy that drug would 
not have to file patent certifications as required under 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.94(a)(12)(ii) (2009). 
 120. Rebecca Goulding (2009) (diagram on file with author). 
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The key difference illustrated in the diagram between 
conventional drug development and open source drug 
development is that during the drug development process, 
there may be an ongoing flow of information to the public under 
an open source license. As shown above, open source licensing 
allows for ongoing sharing of information to the licensor and 
potentially to further licensees. With respect to drug 
development, this characteristic affects not only future or 
follow-on IP licensing, it also has likely impacts in terms of the 
management and financing of the long term development 
program. Each of these issues is explored further below. 
As noted above, there are two interrelated rationales 
variously offered for undertaking open source drug 
development. One is that open source drug development is also 
a means of promoting the free flow of patented information, 
which will result in greater research freedom and more 
innovation overall.121 The idea is that open source licensing 
allows for a path to commercialization while keeping 
information broadly available. As such, it is argued more 
information will be available to others and innovation overall 
can flourish.122 
The other presumed goal of open source drug development 
is that it will yield less expensive, and hence make drugs, more 
                                                      
 121. HOPE, supra note 9, at 105. There are also scientific organizations 
committed to this principle. For example, the BioBricks Foundation states as 
one of its goals, “to develop and provide educational and scientific materials to 
allow the public to use and improve existing BioBrick™ standard biological 
parts, and contribute new BioBrick™ standard biological parts.” See, e.g., The 
BioBricks Foundation, Our Goals, http://bbf.openwetware.org/Our_Goals.html 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (discussing goals of the foundation). 
 122. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents 
and Drug Regulation, HEALTH AFF., Sept.Oct. 2001, at 11935 for this 
argument made outside of the open source context but in the drug context. She 
maintains that more sharing of information, including failed studies would 
allow for more innovation and better drug development overall. Id. The Food 
and Drug Administration Amendment Act (FDAAA), § 801 (2007), legislates a 
certain degree of sharing by requiring sponsors to post certain information 
about clinical trial undertaken and clinical trial results on the public 
clinicaltrials.gov website. It is arguable that this information is useful to 
researchers and clinicians alike. Nonetheless, posting clinical trial results does 
not per se facilitate the scope of sharing envisaged in open source licensing. As 
discussed throughout this article, an open source license would allow 
researchers access to use and modify any aspect of a patented compound. In 
contrast, the clinicaltrials.gov disclosure has no impact on the IP status of a 
compound. 
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accessible.123 This line of thinking holds that if drug compounds 
are not patented and licensed with the intent of creating 
market monopolies, (1) it will be cheaper to license the relevant 
compounds for development, thereby reducing approval costs at 
the outset and reducing potential costs of the end product; and 
(2) there will be more parties making the drugs, more 
competition and, as a result, cheaper drugs. Inherent in this 
approach is an expectation or hope that generic manufacturers 
will readily enter the market if IP does not create a barrier and 
that the entry of the generic manufacturers will ensure that 
lower cost copies of a drug are available, with the net result of 
increasing accessibility overall.124 
Ultimately, this section attempts to answer critical 
questions about how an open source drug development effort 
would play out. This discussion considers: (1) how the OS 
status of an in-licensed compound would unfold and whether 
such a compound could realistically result in a drug that is, or 
whose components are, available on open source terms; (2) how 
an open source drug development effort could be organized 
given likely cost limitations on the effort; and (3) how such an 
effort would be financed in the likely absence of deep 
investments by pharmaceutical companies expecting exclusive 
rights to the final drug product. Although this article suggests 
that the challenges to open source drug development are 
significant, there are potential contexts in which it makes sense 
to pursue open source further. Moreover, it may be important 
to reconsider open source drug development in the context of 
novel financing models. It is possible that if incentives to 
initiate open source drug development were robust under these 
models, at least some of the aforementioned obstacles could be 
overcome.125 
A.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS 
To begin to understand how open source licenses impact 
drug development, this article assumes that the “key” (e.g. 
composition of matter) patent underlying a drug is open source 
licensed and that this open source license subjects the entire 
                                                      
 123. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 12, at 31016. 
 124. HOPE, supra note 9, at 28587. 
 125. This is a subject that merits more discussion and research in the 
future. 
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finished drug to the terms of the open source license.126 That is, 
given the type of open source licensing described above (i.e. 
non-exclusive, royalty-free, available to all comers), all the 
elements of the final drug product would similarly be available 
for licensing on a non-exclusive, royalty-free basis, and for this 
reason it would be straightforward for a generic or other follow-
on version of the drug to be manufactured.127 
If the drug relied on this single open source licensed 
patent, there would be no IP costs involved in in-licensing the 
patent related to drug development. In that case, the terms of 
the open source license on this in-licensed compound would 
apply to the final product as well. Ultimately, competitors or 
generic developers could license either the same in-licensed 
compound or the finished drug product royalty-free to make 
competing products. 
At the same time, it is important to be aware that IP 
related to drug development generally requires more than one 
patented component. Thus, even if the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient compound is licensed or available on open source 
terms, it is possible that the finished drug itself could be 
treated in a conventional proprietary manner. For example, if 
the open source license on the drug compound allowed 
improvements on the compound to be patented and 
conventionally licensed, a drug developer could have an avenue 
for moving a drug that is developed from open source-licensed 
material into a conventional IP stream. Assume that a 
compound X is licensed on open source terms to company 
PHARMA. PHARMA does additional research on X and 
discovers that it is potentially more effective in treatment if 
ESP is added to it. It thus creates the improved version of X, 
namely X-ESP. The open source license terms, under which X 
was licensed, allow improvements to be separately patented 
and do not obligate the patenting party to carry on with open 
source license terms. PHARMA would then have effectively 
removed itself from any open source obligations with regard to 
                                                      
 126. This commentary would also apply if the drug development sponsor 
owns the composition of matter patent and intends for the final drug product 
to be licensed on OS terms. If there were no other licenses necessary for 
development of the drug, the final product would be available for licensing on 
whatever OS terms set by the sponsor. That said, if multiple patents/licenses 
were necessary for development, the sponsor would still face issues with the 
interaction of OS and non-OS licenses as described in this subsection. 
 127. See discussion infra Part V. 
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X-ESP (of course, any developer of unimproved X would still be 
under the open source license obligations). PHARMA could 
then choose to proceed with drug development, with the 
possibility of a patent on the end product. 
It is also important to recognize that the relationship 
between patents and drug development may be complex, and 
that this complexity may stand in the way of realizing an open 
source-licensed drug product. In reality, drugs do not usually 
rely on a single patented compound or single license, but 
instead generally depend on several—and potentially many—
patents including composition of matter, delivery systems, use, 
manufacturing aspects, and others.128 A conventional (non-open 
source) license for a patent generally requires the licensee to 
ensure that there is no infringement of the licensed patent 
when that licensed patent is combined with other IP.129 
Further, there are often other terms that dictate the conditions 
under which the licensed patent can be sublicensed—or 
whether it can at all.130 Importantly, the conventional license 
generally may be revoked if you attempt to make the licensed 
patent information available non-exclusively or on terms that 
are not deemed to be protective enough.131 
Such terms could have implications on the cost and 
                                                      
 128. See Generic Pharmaceuticals: Marketplace Access and Consumer 
Issues Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th 
Cong. 58 (2002) (statement of Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO of the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association) (“[S]ince the enactment of Hatch-
Waxman in 1984, the average number of patents filed per blockbuster has 
increased five-fold—from two to an astounding ten patents per drug.”), 
available at http://www.gphaonline.org/resources/2002/04/22/drug-pricing-and-
consumer-costs. 
 129. See Eileen Smith Ewing, Research and Development Collaborations, in 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 445, 461 (Hugh B. Wellons et al. eds., 2007). 
 130. See generally id. at 460–62 (explaining the license process). 
 131. But see BiOS GRIT, supra note 53, at § 3.4 (demonstrating that some 
developers of OS licenses attempt to address this potential by including terms 
in those OS licenses that would override conflicting terms in other licensed 
technologies or—alternatively—would invalidate the original OS license. “In 
the event that BiOS LICENSEE has pre-existing obligations to third parties, 
which obligations would conflict with BiOS LICENSEE’s obligations as 
defined in this Agreement, BiOS LICENSEE shall not make any use of the IP 
& Technology that would invoke such conflicting obligations, unless a waiver 
of said conflicting obligations is obtained by BiOS LICENSEE from said third 
party. . . . In the event that BiOS LICENSEE enters into an agreement the 
terms of which would conflict with BiOS LICENSEE’s obligations under this 
Agreement, the terms of this Agreement will prevail.”). 
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accessibility of IP information for the final product, particularly 
if there are multiple patents licensed for the production of a 
drug and not all of those patents are on open source terms. In 
that case, it would require a diligent effort to ensure that the 
open source license terms can be applied to the final product, 
without violating the terms of any conventional licenses. Drug 
developers could well be faced with the question of whether a 
non- open source licensed entity plus an open source licensed 
entity can equal an open source product, or whether the non- 
open source licensing provisions require that any product 
combining multiple patents respect the non-open source license 
terms. These are important questions and would determine 
whether an open source-licensed compound, when added to 
other necessary licensed information, would result in a product 
that could be open source-licensed or whose components would 
be licensable by others on similar non-exclusive, royalty-free 
terms. 
B.  COST AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
Putting aside the complexity of the IP inputs, the analysis 
turns now to the cost and organizational requirements of drug 
development. Conventionally, drugs are developed in, or under 
the auspices of a pharmaceutical company that invests 
significant resources and organizes the process for such a 
project in the expectation that market exclusivity will allow for 
some return on investment. 132 In contrast, the financial 
incentives for a pharmaceutical sponsor to invest money and 
resources in open source drug development are limited; there 
the goal is for the final product (or all relevant IP inputs) to be 
available on open source licensed terms, meaning there would 
likely not, subject to the discussion in Section V infra, be an 
exclusive interest in the final drug product. One result of this 
different potential return is that it is likely that the sponsor of 
an open source drug would want to minimize the costs of 
development. Further, to the extent that open source drug 
development is intended to result in less costly, more accessible 
drugs, there is an additional impetus to make the development 
process less expensive. 
In the software sector, the bazaar model of production has 
                                                      
 132. See, e.g., Covance: the CRO for Drug Development Services, 
http://www.covance.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (example of third party 
vendor or Contract Research Organization). 
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been identified as the source, not only of creativity, but also of a 
lower cost, less hierarchical mode of production.133 In that 
idealized model, individuals contribute their efforts from 
multiple decentralized nodes, minimizing space and equipment 
costs otherwise incurred by large hierarchical organizations.134 
Further, in the bazaar model there is no organizational lead, a 
further cost savings, and instead progress is made via the 
cumulative, potentially more creative, efforts of the 
participants.135 
Some have proposed that an analogous approach might be 
used in the drug development arena to similarly minimize costs 
and maximize participation.136 Unfortunately, the potential for 
implementing such a model in drug development is limited by 
the very different requirements of that sector. Unlike most 
software development, drug development is characterized by 
significant regulatory requirements that dictate that work be 
carried out in laboratories expressly designed for such efforts. 
As described above, any clinical trials relevant to submission of 
a NDA or BLA must be carried out according to strict, 
regulatory-agency defined GCPs. Further, any preclinical work 
is subject to Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) while production 
of final products must conform with Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP). Altogether, these GXPs—as they are 
sometimes known—mean that any work done on drug 
                                                      
 133. See RAYMOND, supra note 37, at 2778 (contrasting the bazaar, or 
open source, method of software development with traditional forms, and 
extolling the virtues of open source). 
 134. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 20 (“Open source development shows how 
groups of volunteers can ‘collaborate on a complex economic project, sustain 
that collaboration over time, and build something that they give away freely’—
technology that can ‘beat some of the largest and richest business enterprises 
in the world at their own game.’”); see also OSDD, supra note 17 (noting that 
incipient efforts in OS drug discovery by the Open Source Drug Discovery 
Foundation rely heavily on this model for leveraging creativity while 
minimizing costs). 
 135. See generally RAYMOND, supra note 37 (summarizing the emergence of 
the OS movement in software and information technology). 
 136. See, e.g., Maurer et al., supra note 4, at 184 (arguing that well-
designed open-source licenses are the key to containing Virtual Pharmas’ R&D 
costs.); HOPE, supra note 9, at 20 (“A key premise of this book is that open 
source principles of technology, development, licensing, and commercial 
exploitation offer at least a partial solution to the innovation lock-down caused 
by extensive public control over scientific and technological information within 
a highly concentrated industry structure.”). 
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development must be carried out in appropriate facilities, by 
individuals with the skills necessary to meet these 
requirements, and with the proper record-keeping and 
documentation undertaken.137 As a general rule, these 
standards are not the norm in research laboratories and any 
work carried out in non-conforming manner would likely need 
to be redone for regulators to accept them.138 
Further, drug development has fixed phases and targets 
that must be met, generally in a sequential manner. The FDA 
meets with sponsors throughout the process to determine 
whether such targets—beginning with preclinical studies and 
continuing with the clinical trials themselves—have been 
achieved.139 This process does not lend itself to a decentralized 
bazaar-like development process where multiple parties work 
toward the success of an end product. Instead, the drug 
development process likely proceeds best when there is a 
project manager ensuring that each stage and target has been 
appropriately met, and subject matter experts can guide 
specific elements of the process. These individuals may include 
project managers, experts in pre-clinical and clinical studies as 
well as individuals knowledgeable in the regulatory process, IP, 
financing, marketing and post-marketing issues. 
Certain “virtual pharma” companies have found a way to 
embrace a decentralized organizational structure while 
maintaining the process controls necessary to meet drug 
development requirements.140 The concept of “virtual pharma” 
is that all the functions of a large pharmaceutical company can 
be harnessed without the massive corporate structure that 
those entities generally have.141 Instead, in “virtual pharma,” a 
small number of experts work together to manage the process 
of drug development, and hire or commission the necessary 
experts in various functions as the process unfolds.142 Thus, the 
                                                      
 137. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211 (2008) (GMPs); 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 54, 56, 
312 (2009) (GCPs); 21 C.F.R. pt. 58 (2009) (GLPs) (collectively, “GXP”). 
 138. For example, even work carried out outside the U.S. for submission in 
a U.S. NDA must have been carried out in compliance with regulations. 
 139. FDA Drug Review Process website, supra note 93. 
 140. See Hal Broderson, Virtual Reality: The Promise and Pitfalls of Going 
Virtual, 23 NATURE 1205, 1206 (2005) (“The virtual model gives management 
the flexibility to tap a vast network of clinical development talent—without 
actually bringing them in house.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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“virtual” company may be composed only of an executive 
decision-maker, project manager, finance management, medical 
management, scientists who know the molecule and its biology, 
patent counsel and, depending on the context, one or two 
others. This team would be responsible for managing the 
process so that, for example, the many various necessary 
functionssuch as appropriate toxicologistsmight be brought 
on board as consultants during the appropriate phase of the 
project and so on. The benefit is that the company can operate 
in a leanand potentially costsavingmanner, but can still 
ensure that all necessary functions are represented. 
Ultimately, sponsors are unlikely able to achieve the 
milestones and requirements of drug development in a bazaar-
like model. A virtual pharma approach, however, may help 
minimize organizational and process related costs of drug 
development, especially in the earlier stages, while still 
ensuring that any work done will meet the standards of 
regulatory compliance required in the industry. 
C.  SUSTAINABLE FUNDING 
Even if costs could be somewhat managed through a 
virtual pharma model, the extensive regulatory process means 
that drug development costs will still be significant and a large 
source of financing needs to be available. As noted, drug 
development currently rests on the expectation that market 
exclusivity will allow some return on investment. 
Pharmaceutical companies employ sophisticated risk analyses 
to gauge the likelihood of success and the potential returns that 
can be generated. Based on these analyses, the companies 
invest the millions of dollars that are required to harness the 
expertise, provide GXP compliant facilities, undertake the 
clinical trials, and put together a viable package for regulatory 
review in multiple countries.143 
Without the potential market returns permitted by 
exclusive market rights, it is possible that funding of the 
development process would need to come from sources other 
than pharmaceutical companies. The question then becomes: 
who would offer similarly sustainable funding and why? 
                                                      
 143. See generally DiMasi et al., supra note 63 (providing a statistical 
analysis of the costs that go into drug development at various stages). 
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The answer to this question is well beyond the scope of this 
article. However, it is worth noting a few of the proposals that 
have been put forward on this issue. For example, currently, 
governments effectively pay for much of pharmaceutical 
development by expending large amounts to purchase 
pharmaceuticals at the end of the development process.144 
Some argue that governments could get a better return on their 
spending in this area by funding the upfront research into 
pharmaceuticals, thereby gaining access to non-proprietary, 
cheaper-end products.145 While there is some logical appeal to 
this argument, it may be difficult for governments to risk 
taxpayer money on a large outgoing expense that almost 
certainly will not, in most cases, yield end products.146 Further, 
casting governments in the role of funding parties and 
regulators of pharmaceutical products will inevitably result in 
ongoing issues of conflict of interestpotentially pitting 
expensive safety regulations against the desire for less costly 
development processes. 
Another alternative frequently mentioned is that well-
endowed foundations take on the role of funding drug 
development in order to fulfill organizational objectives of 
making certain types and classes of drugs more available.147 
The model of public private partnerships has also been offered 
as a potential approach and occupies a growing place in the 
pharmaceutical development world.148 
                                                      
 144. This is true even in the U.S. where there is no universal health care; 
through the Medicare, Medicaid, Department of Defense and Veteran’s 
Administration, the U.S. government actually buys a huge portion of 
pharmaceutical products.  
 145. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 28788. In the U.S., the National Institutes 
of Health and the National Cancer Institute invest large sums in research. As 
a general matter, however, this investment is in research based activities and 
there is little capacity in these agencies to actually take a compound through 
the drug development process. 
 146. It is unlikely that governments will have a better success rate than 
that biopharma achieves and indeed, there are many reasons to expect that 
the success rate of government-run trials will be lower and the costs higher. 
Government entities may have a hard time picking potential ‘winner’ 
candidates and, conversely, may have a hard time stopping losers, especially 
when doing so will be subject to political pressures in addition to patient 
advocacy pressures we have now. 
 147. See HOPE, supra note 9, at 288. 
 148. Mary Moran, The New Landscape of Neglected Disease Drug 
Development, in CURING MALARIA TOGETHER: ANNUAL REPORT 2005 5, 
available at http://www.mmv.org/IMG/pdf/Full_Report.pdf (providing an 
example of a “public private partnership working on diseases of the developing 
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These are issues that continue to be the focus of discussion 
and study, and will need to be a central part of any effort to 
move discussion of open source drug development forward. 
V.  ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF OPEN SOURCE DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT 
As noted earlier, proponents of open source drug 
development have variously identified two aims for adopting 
this approach. One is to ensure greater access to the 
information inputs and outputs of drug development so that 
there is greater potential for ongoing scientific exchange and 
innovation. To a large extent, this seems an achievable goal. By 
definition, open source licensed information is available on a 
non-exclusive, royalty-free basis, often with the obligation that 
any derivations or improvement on the ideas are similarly 
available. 
The second goal relating to end products that are less 
costly and more accessible is a far greater challenge. Utilizing 
open source drug development to make drugs less costly rests 
on two significant presumptions: (1) that the research and 
development costs related to open source drug development will 
be less than that of conventional drugs, lowering costs that are 
passed on to purchasers; and (2) that greater competition 
resulting from the absence of monopoly rights will drive prices 
down. This section examines this goal further and concludes 
that neither of these claims will always be true for open source 
drug development and thus it is not clear that open source drug 
development will, in all cases, result in lower cost drugs. 
Nevertheless, the discussion leaves open the possibility that 
there are situations where open source drug development 
might result in less costly drugs with the additional benefit of 
leaving key drug development information available to other 
licensees and innovators. 
A.  DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
The discussion in Section IV above, suggested that it is 
possible that drug development costs be reduced. However, the 
amount of cost reduction, and whether it is enough to 
significantly lower prices for purchasers, is uncertain. If the 
                                                      
world”). 
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compound being developed is in-licensed under open source 
terms, costs relating to licensing for that compound at that 
stage of development would be minimal (i.e., an open source 
license is generally non-exclusive and royalty-free). The caveat, 
of course, is that to the extent non-open source 
molecules/compounds need to be licensed into the development 
process (which raises the specter of IP complications, as 
discussed above), there could still be significant costs 
associated with licensing. 
There is also a potential for some cost savings at the front 
end if the drug development is carried out under a virtual 
pharma model as discussed above, as the need for personnel 
and overhead may be somewhat reduced. These savings are 
hard to quantify without knowing the specific needs of the 
development program in question. 
Even with this potential for cost savings, it is important to 
recognize that the main drivers of drug development costs will 
exist for open source drug development as well. These include 
the cost of maintaining GXP compliant laboratories and 
undertaking pre-clinical studies, which can individually range 
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The costs of clinical 
trials often range into the millions of dollars and added to that 
are costs related to preparing a regulatory package.149 If 
successful there will be additional expenses related to 
establishing manufacturing capacity, testing and distribution 
of products. Ultimately, while the cost per molecule may not be 
the $800 million claimed by industry, it will still be significant 
and require extensive capital resources. 
B.  PRICE COMPETITION 
The second prong of presumed lower costs for drugs 
developed through open source drug development is that they 
will be subject to greater competition in the marketplace and 
hence, prices will be dramatically lower. Specifically, the claim 
is that without the monopoly rights available to conventionally 
developed drugs, generic competition will be immediate and 
will result in very low drug prices. 
Conventionally, pharmaceutical companies develop 
compounds that are the subject of proprietary IP protection. 
This allows the company a statutory monopoly on the approved 
                                                      
 149. DiMasi et al., supra note 63, at 162 tbl. 1. 
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product for some fixed period of time. Depending on the 
country, the developer may have additional time tacked on to 
the end of the patent life, either via a patent term extension of 
half the time taken to get regulatory approval (e.g., under the 
Hatch Waxman Act150 in the U.S. which grants the drug 
developer an extension of the patent life of a product to make 
up for the lengthy duration of drug approval, up to a maximum 
period of 14 years of patent life plus patent term extension) or 
via some kind of regulatory exclusivity. 
Because open source licensed compounds are, by definition, 
freely shared, an open source-licensed compound could be 
licensed to multiple parties at the same time, and all of those 
licensees could pursue drug development at the same time. 
Alternatively, competitors could be free to access the open 
source licensed compound post-approval to apply for generic 
status at any time.151 That is, there would be no period of 
exclusivity. 
When considering the potential for generic (or any other 
competition) to a pharmaceutical, it is important to remember 
that for any drug product, regulatory approval is required prior 
to marketing.152 Products cannot simply be placed on the 
market. Thus, when speculating about increased competition, 
one also has to consider the costs and incentives for getting to 
market. 
There are two routes for copies of a drug to come to market. 
The first is that a second party can sponsor a full drug 
development for the same molecule or compound under Section 
505(b)(1) of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.153 
                                                      
 150. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 
21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 
156, 271, 282 (1994)). 
 151. As discussed above, the availability of the final product on OS terms 
will depend on how other licenses interact with the OS license. It is possible 
that a subsequent license could force an override of any OS provisions that 
would share exclusively licensed IP. 
 152. Post-marketing changes are also heavily regulated. For example: for 
example, notice to regulators has to be made for all changes in manufacturing, 
safety information, drug interaction information and the like. Depending on 
the type of change, approval by regulators must be obtained before doing it. 
 153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006); DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND 
INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 4.02, at 4–3 
to 4–56 (6th ed. 2004). 
MARDEN LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:43 AM 
2010] OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT 259 
In the case of open source drug development, two parties could 
presumably license the molecule or compound and do the 
necessary studies for submission. This approach requires full 
costs for each party. 
The second avenue is as a generic version of the drug, 
under an abbreviated drug approval process. Generic drugs 
may be approved by regulators when the patent term and 
relevant regulatory exclusivities have expired.154 Abbreviated 
submissions generally require GXP compliant evidence of 
bioequivalence, as well as evidence of manufacturing 
capabilities. Generic manufacturers also have post-marketing 
safety reporting obligations and are subject to similarly tight 
controls on ingredient quality, sourcing, and other 
manufacturing issues.155 While these requirements are 
certainly not as extensive as those required for the first 
approved reference drug, they do require that a sponsoring 
company has specific capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. 
Prices of drugs generally drop once a generic drug 
competitor is introduced. The magnitude of the drop in prices is 
a function of how much competition there is. The introduction 
of a single generic, for example, generally only causes a price 
drop of under 30%, while the price can drop more substantially 
when there are multiple competitors.156 As a general rule, 
pricing of generic drugs is a reflection of market competition—
or, in countries, where drug prices are regulated—of prices set 
by relevant authorities. 
Importantly, the potential for increased competition does 
not per se guarantee that open source developed drugs will be 
cheap. If only one entity takes the drug through to marketing 
authorization, that entity will have a monopoly by default and 
can set the prices per market rates—or per national pricing 
authorities (or, of course, based on market access levels). At the 
same time, it is possible that if the product is profitable or there 
is a potentially large market for it, other competitors may come 
on the market as generics. But it is also possible that the size of 
the marketor any number of other factors including 
availability of active ingredients, marketing costs, potential 
                                                      
 154. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006). 
 155. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81 (2009). 
 156. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, 
and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & 
ECON. 331, 336 (1992). 
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liabilities or other factors—could make generic development 
unattractive to other parties. There are numerous instances 
where the brand company that initially obtained approval for a 
drug remains the only manufacturer of that product despite the 
expiration of patents. 
Also, there can be considerable variation in the amount of 
price reduction that results from generic entry. If the cost of 
manufacturing remains high because of costs of ingredients or 
processes, the end product is likely to be costly as well. Finally, 
although it may appear natural to look to generic companies to 
engage in open source drug development, that would be an 
entirely new role for such companies. Generic companies 
currently produce drugs that have already been proven safe 
and effective, and such companies enter proven markets that 
have years of history. In contrast, generic companies 
attempting to develop a new drug that is open source based 
would be taking on new risk much greater than they now face. 
It is far from clear that many would do so. 
C.  POSSIBLE SCENARIOS? 
It is possible that a philanthropic consortium dedicated to 
improving access for a specific therapeutic area could fund an 
open source drug development program with the aim of 
developing the drug at low cost and seeding the field for generic 
competition. If that organization chose a drug with a large 
potential market, it is likely that a generic marketplace would 
emerge for the drug. The program could be further supported 
by making sure relevant manufacturing technology transfer 
was also available to potential competitors. 
The potential benefits of such a program are multi-faceted. 
First, the consortium would be undertaking the significant 
investment of developing a (needed) drug. It would be doing so 
while allowing other researchers to continue using the relevant 
compound, thus enabling the possibility of additional 
innovation. Further, the consortium would be putting together 
a package that others could rely on for abbreviated approvals to 
make the same drug at potentially cheaper prices. It is possible 
that the number of potential purchasers of generic versions of 
the drug offers sufficient incentives to generic companies to 
manufacture copies of the drug that would be sold for less. If 
that happened, the consortium would, arguably, have created a 
self-sustaining system for accessible drugs without, necessarily, 
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having to invest in long term access for the drug. That said, the 
consortium would still have had to invest the up front costs to 
undertake drug development. In addition, there are questions 
of scope and sustainability: given the large amount of resources 
required, it is unclear how many such initiatives could be 
undertaken and for how long. 
Other scenarios that have been suggested are various 
kinds of public-private partnerships and new types of 
corporations that have explicit social requirements built into 
their structure.157 An example of the latter is the Community 
Interest Company (CIC), which was first enacted into law in 
the United Kingdom in 2005.158 These corporations are 
designed to appeal to investors who are willing to cap their 
financial rewards on the grounds that the company is making a 
significant, identifiable social contribution.159 So far, such 
companies have not appeared in a significant way in the 
biopharmaceutical sector, but it would seem that if the need to 
maximize profits is somewhat offset by social goals, there is at 
least in principle the possibility that such companies could offer 
their products at lower cost and thus increase accessibility. 
VI.  INTERIM CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF 
OPEN SOURCE DRUG DEVELOPMENT? 
Conceptually, open source drug development is presented 
as a route for ensuring that the open source-licensed IP related 
to drug development remains available and for greater access 
to healthcare products. However, as described in this article, 
open source drug development would involve complex IP 
relationships, a lengthy and expensive development process, 
novel and potentially difficult management, staffing and 
financing, while at best offering uncertain impacts on cost and 
accessibility. It is difficult to imagine a system so encumbered 
being widely adopted for drug development and it seems 
                                                      
 157. I credit Ed Levy with developing this line of thought. 
 158. Community Interest Company Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1788 
(U.K.). 
 159. Fraser Valley Centre for Social Enterprise, Analysis of L3C and CIC 
Social Enterprise Models, http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com/index.html 
(follow “2. For a Centre document outlining the characteristics of the US and 
UK legal models for social enterprise” hyperlink), at 5 (last visited, June 1, 
2009); see also List of Community Interest Companies, 
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/coSearch/companyList.shtml (last visited, Oct. 
22, 2009). 
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unlikely that a private company would be interested in taking 
on such a process. 
Despite these hurdles, the goals of open source drug 
development remain worthy and should be the subject of 
further discussion. In order to advance the conversation 
further, this article closes with brief comments on: (1) whether 
there are more targeted uses of open source that might be more 
readily adopted, (2) whether additional incentives could 
overcome some of the hurdles identified and spur adoption of 
open source practices in drug development, and finally (3) 
whether there are alternative pathways to the goals underlying 
open source drug development. 
A. DIAGNOSTICS AS A POTENTIAL MODEL AREA FOR OPEN 
SOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
Diagnostics are tools which indicate the presence or 
absence of a disease or potential treatment possibilities for a 
certain type of disease. 160 Such tools are increasingly prevalent 
with the emergence of personalized medicine, which aims for 
targeted use of therapeutic products. 
Currently, in the U.S. laboratory-developed diagnostic 
assays161—those assays for which a blood, urine, or DNA (or 
other) sample is sent away to a lab for analysis (as opposed to a 
kit sold on the market)—are not subject to the same standards 
of regulation as drugs or biologics. In fact, at present in the 
U.S., such assays must only be compliant with standards that 
require that there is analytic validity, meaning that the tests 
must yield the same results each time.162 There is no pre-
                                                      
 160. In-Vitro diagnostic is defined in 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2009). 
 161. A laboratory-developed assay is one developed by a clinical laboratory 
for use only by that facility. Diagnostics are regulated as a subset of the 
medical device category. See 21 U.S.C. §321(h) (2009). Therefore, diagnostics 
are subject to a different regulatory regime than drugs and biologics. See, e.g., 
21 U.S.C. §360(c), (e). Laboratory-developed assays represent a very small 
subset of the medical device, or diagnostic, categories. Nevertheless, they are 
of particular interest for purposes of this discussion because of their uncertain 
and shifting regulatory oversight. 
 162. The relevant standards in the U.S. are the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Act (CLIA), Pub. L. No. 90–174, 81 Stat. 533, and related 
regulations administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. 
See 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (2008). While CLIA establishes certain laboratory 
standards, e.g., for certification, quality assurance, quality control and 
personnel, it provides minimal standards for assessment of analytical validity 
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market safety or efficacy review in a manner analogous to what 
is required of drugs.163 Further, competitor tests can come on 
the market with exactly the same minimal regulatory hurdle as 
long as there is no proprietary position barring that entry. 
There is no “generic” pathway or approval needed. 
Despite this much less burdensome regulatory regime, 
diagnostics can be very expensive and inaccessible because 
patent exclusivity allows companies to charge monopoly 
prices.164 Hypothetically, open source licensing of the 
underlying IP could change this situation. If the underlying IP 
were licensed out on open source terms, multiple parties could 
develop the same or competitor diagnostic products and the 
cost of such products should drop. Given the relatively low costs 
of putting such diagnostics on the market in terms of 
regulation, the potential revenue from charging parties to run 
the assay may provide enough financial incentive for parties to 
continue to develop the tests. 
As discussed supra, the IP landscape on any given product 
may be complex. If a diagnostic were based on a single open 
source licensed patent, it too would be available on open source 
terms. However, many diagnostic assays are algorithm based, 
meaning that they rely on relationships between the presence 
and activity of multiple genesand likely multiple patentsto 
make probabilistic assessments about the likelihood of a 
disease or condition. As explored in Section IV.A, above, it 
would be difficult to establish open source licensing for all 
relevant inputs and the interplay of open source and non-open 
source licenses would likely be complex. This is, however, a 
topic worth further exploration. 
B. ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES 
It may also be worth considering the introduction of 
                                                      
and no standards for the assessment of clinical validity (i.e. efficacy). 
 163. In the past several years, the FDA has been evaluating whether it 
should change these practices and has issued a draft guidance proposed that 
certain laboratory based diagnostic assays be subject to PreMarket Approval 
(21 C.F.R. § 814), like certain other medical devices. See FDA, Draft Guidance 
for Industry, Clinical Laboratories, and FDA Staff—In Vitro Diagnostic 
Multivariate Index Assays, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceD
ocuments/ucm079148.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). 
 164. E. RICHARD GOLD & JULIA CARBONE, MYRIAD GENETICS: IN THE EYE 
OF A POLICY STORM 25 (2008) , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260098 
(follow “download” hyperlink). 
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additional incentives to foster adoption of open source licensing 
in the biomedical sciences. The rationale is that a greater 
number of open source licenses increases access to information 
overall and makes it easier to combine multiple licenses to 
create an open source product. 
For example, one could introduce a new form of data 
exclusivity, administered by a regulator, that rewards drug 
development of an open source licensed molecule, pathway or 
process.165 In the short term, the data exclusivity would allow 
the drug developer a certain fixed term of market monopoly, by 
blocking others from relying on the approval data to file a 
generic application. This would allow the drug developer a fixed 
term to recoup some of its investment. The benefit of using data 
exclusivity rather than a patent would be that the underlying 
IP would remain under open source terms and available for use 
by others in ongoing research and innovation. 
A data exclusivity awarded to open source drug 
development would stand in the way of price reductions due to 
generic competition. However, after the course of the data 
exclusivity, generics would also be able to rely on the original 
submission to regulators in their abbreviated applications. 
C. OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO ACHIEVE SIMILAR ENDS 
Even as open source drug development continues to be 
explored, it is worth considering other alternatives to achieve 
similar ends. As discussed above, there are two potential co-
existing aims for using open source in drug development, 
namely: (1) to keep the knowledge inputs into drug 
development available for use without IP barriers, and (2) to 
make healthcare products less costly and more accessible. 
With respect to the first goal, there are other potential 
options to keeping material available to other researchers and 
drug developers. For example, at present there exists a 
“research exemption” from patent infringement available to 
                                                      
 165. My colleague Ed Levy initially suggested this idea in the context of 
open source to me. See also HOPE, supra note 9, at 215 (stating that exclusive 
marketing rights obtained by FDA approval may provide “[sufficient] incentive 
to induce commercial actors to engage in the more costly aspects of integration 
while still not being a strong enough proprietary or quasi proprietary right to 
deter upstream contributions”). For a discussion of the role of FDA 
exclusivities on innovation, see Rebecca Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007). 
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those using patented information for purely research, non-
commercial ends.166 In recent years, courtsparticularly in the 
U.S.have blurred the lines of this exemption and suggested 
that any research that could potentially ultimately have 
commercial uses, is outside the exemption.167 These decisions 
have complicated reliance on a research exemption for 
researchers. Simply clarifying and codifying a broad research 
exemption through legislation could potentially go a long way 
toward making patented information available to a wide base 
for ongoing knowledge development. One can speculate as well 
that reducing licensing costs for inputs to drug developmentif 
applicablecould yield some reduction in the overall costs of 
drug development. However, such cost reductions are likely to 
be minimal in contrast to the required regulatory elements. 
Another option, which may address both goals of open 
source, is targeted use of patent pools. Patent pools aim to 
make a certain set of intellectual property available in an effort 
to overcome the potential of patent thickets or other IP blocks. 
In a forthcoming article,168 my colleagues develop the argument 
that patent pools might be used as a tool to promote open 
science and access to information. In this context, it is worth 
exploring further how patent pools may similarly make drug 
development more accessible and less costly (with the same 
caveat as above, that the costs of completing required 
regulatory elements remains very high). GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) recently announced that they would make certain 
patents available publicly in a “pool” to promote development of 
drugs for neglected diseases.169 While one could question 
                                                      
 166. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). To encourage development and expedite 
the introduction of pharmaceuticals into the marketplace, Congress amended 
the patent laws in 1984 to insulate drug research from charges of 
infringement so long as such research is “solely for uses reasonably related to 
the development and submission of information” to FDA. Thus, activities that 
would otherwise constitute patent infringement noninfringing if they are 
undertaken for the purpose of developing and submitting to the FDA 
information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a new chemical entity, 
a medical device, or a food additive. 
 167. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); 
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Taken together, these 
cases suggest that any research that has ultimate commercial aims does not 
fall under the research exemption. The impact of these cases continues to be 
the subject of legal discussion and interpretation. 
 168. Ed Levy et al., Patent Pools and Genomics: Navigating a Course to 
Open Science?, 16 B.U. J. SCI & TECH L. 75 (2010) 
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whether the GSK arrangement fits the definition of a patent 
pool, we think this variation should be explored further as a 
potential avenue for furthering drug development in certain 
areas. It may be that novel financing or tax tools, in 
combination with some form or variation of patent pools, 
provides an appropriate and workable path to less expensive 
and more accessible drugs. 
A third approach would be to develop licensing strategies 
that permit greater access for certain usesfor example, for 
drug development for neglected disease or use by those in the 
developing world.170 The idea, again, is to reduce the 
intellectual property costs associated with drug development in 
an effort to reduce the cost and promote accessibility to the 
resulting drug product. 
In addition to these alternative approaches to intellectual 
property, there are other novel mechanisms that could be 
considered to reach similar goals. These could include novel 
regulatory approaches that might streamline the regulatory 
obligations in certain situations, alternative regulatory 
incentives, and the potential for developing greater access to 
abandoned drug development programs. Greater thought and 
attention is needed in each of these areas. 
The ultimate goal of making drugs less costly and more 
accessible through the application of alternative IP regimes is a 
good one. However, any such attempt is far from simple. The IP 
landscape of drugs is highly complex and any attempt at 
change must be weighed against a web of regulation and other 
legal requirements. There is hope, however, that a carefully 
considered combination of changes to IP, financingand 
possibly regulationcan achieve the goal. 
 
                                                      
School: Big Pharma as a Catalyst for Change (Feb. 13, 2009), available at 
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